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Abstract Remote data integrity checking (RDIC) en-
ables a server to prove to an auditor the integrity of
a stored file. It is a useful technology for remote stor-
age such as cloud storage. The auditor could be a party
other than the data owner; hence an RDIC proof is
based usually on publicly available information. To cap-
ture the need of data privacy against an untrusted au-
ditor, Hao et al. formally defined “privacy against third
party verifiers” as one of the security requirements and
proposed a protocol satisfying this definition. However,
we observe that all existing protocols with public veri-
fiability supporting data update, including Hao et al.’s
proposal, require the data owner to publish some meta-
data related to the stored data. We show that the audi-
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tor can tell whether or not a client has stored a specific
file and link various parts of those files based solely
on the published meta-data in Hao et al.’s protocol.
In other words, the notion “privacy against third party
verifiers” is not sufficient in protecting data privacy and
hence we introduce “zero-knowledge privacy” to ensure
the third party verifier learns nothing about the client’s
data from all available information. We enhance the
privacy of Hao et al.’s protocol, develop a prototype to
evaluate the performance and perform experiment to
demonstrate the practicality of our proposal.
1 Introduction
Cloud computing is emerging as a dominant technology
category in the business community. While the benefits
of cloud computing are clear, it also introduces new se-
curity challenges. See [1] for a comprehensive survey.
Cloud storage services, which allow data owners to mi-
grate their data from local storage systems to the cloud,
relieve the burden of storage management and mainte-
nance. They offer scalable, pay-on-demand, location-
independent storage service for users [2]. However, this
new kind of data hosting service does trigger many new
security challenges [3]. Indeed, the Cloud Security Al-
liance (CSA) [4] regards Data Loss & Leakage as the
second among the top seven security threats to cloud
computing. For example, Business Insiders reported 1
that some data were destroyed in an EC2 cloud ser-
vices crash in 2011. In addition, it is not mandatory for
the service providers to report these incidents. In cloud
1 Amazon’s Cloud Crash Disaster Perma-
nently Destroyed Many Customers’ Data,
http://www.businessinsider.com.au/amazon-lost-data-
2011-4
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storage setting, due to the loss of physical possession of
data, a major concern of cloud users is whether their
data are stored in the cloud safely. If the cloud servers
are not fully trusted, the integrity of stored data could
not be ensured. Consequently, there is a need for the
development of protocols allowing the data owners to
verify that their data are correctly stored in the cloud.
Traditional cryptographic technologies for data in-
tegrity checking such as message authentication codes
and digital signatures are not ideal to Remote data in-
tegrity checking (RDIC) because the original file is re-
quired in the verification procedure. It is an expensive
exercise to download the entire file from the cloud for
verification. Blum presented a scheme enabling data
owners to verify the integrity of remote data without
explicit knowledge of the entire data [5]. Provable data
possession (PDP) [6, 7], introduced by Ateniese et al.,
is a technique for validating data integrity over remote
servers. In a typical PDP system, the data owner gener-
ates some metadata for a file, which will be used later
for integrity checking via a challenge-response proto-
col with the remote server. Data owner then sends his
file to a remote server, which may be untrusted, and
deletes the file from its local storage. To generate a
proof that the server hosts the file in its original form,
the server computes a response to a challenge from
the verifier. The verifier validates that the file is not
being tampered with via checking the correctness of
the response. Ateniese et al. also proposed two PDP
schemes by utilizing the RSA-based homomorphic lin-
ear authenticators. At the same time, Juels et al. pro-
posed the notion of proof of retrievability (POR) [8],
in which error-correcting codes and spot-checking are
employed to achieve the properties of possession and
retrievability of files. PDP and POR have become a re-
search hotspot of secure cloud storage and a number
of schemes have been proposed [9, 11–19]. Besides in-
tegrity checking, three advanced features, namely, data
dynamics, public verifiability and privacy against veri-
fiers are also considered for practical purposes.
– Data dynamics. This property allows the data
owners to dynamically update their stored data af-
ter they store their data at the remote server. The
main dynamics operation involves data insertion,
data modification, data deletion and data append-
ing. Ateniese et al. [20] described a dynamic PDP
scheme based on cryptographic hash functions and
symmetric key encryptions that is highly efficient.
However, there is a priori bound on the number of
queries and block insertion is not explicitly sup-
ported. Wang et al. [21] proposed dynamic data
storage in a distributed application but support for
dynamic data operation is still partial. Erway et
al. [22] extended the PDP model due to Ateniese
et al. to data update by leveraging rank-based au-
thenticated skip lists. They constructed a fully dy-
namic PDP by cleverly moving the index part from
tag computation and authenticating the tag of chal-
lenged or updated blocks using authenticated skip
list before the integrity checking process. Wang et
al. [14] improved the previous PDP models by ma-
nipulating the classic Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) for
block tag authentication. They used MHT to au-
thenticate both the data values and the positions of
data blocks by treating the leaf nodes as the left-
to-right sequence such that any leaf node can be
uniquely determined by following left-to-right se-
quence and the approach to computing the root in
MHT.
– Public verifiability. This property allows an ex-
ternal auditor or anyone, not just the data owner,
to have the capability to verify the integrity of the
stored data on demand. Publicly verifiable data in-
tegrity checking schemes is gaining favour due to its
practicality in many applications in which data own-
ers are not able to afford the overhead of periodical
auditing. Ateniese et al. [6] considered this issue for
the first time in their PDP model and described a
variant with public verifiability of their basic PDP
scheme. Shacham and Waters [9] proposed compact
proofs of retrievability by making use of publicly
verifiable homomorphic authenticators built from
the BLS signature [23]. Their scheme relies on the
homomorphic properties to aggregate a proof into
a small authenticator value and the public retriev-
ability are also achieved. Due to the short signature
length of BLS signature, the Shacham and Waters
scheme is space efficient. Subsequent works based on
their constructions include [14,15,17]. These schemes
provide additional properties in addition to public
verifiability.
– Data privacy. In the remote data integrity check-
ing schemes with public verifiability, the data pri-
vacy issue should be considered since external au-
ditors (or anyone) can check the integrity of the
stored data. Data privacy against third party veri-
fiers is highly essential for data owners in the sense
that they may store confidential or sensitive files like
business contracts, medical records, to cloud. How-
ever, the importance of data privacy in the publicly
verifiable checking has not received adequate atten-
tion [12,15] and this issue has not been fully investi-
gated. Although data privacy is discussed in [15], a
formal analysis is absent. Informally speaking, “data
privacy” requires that the verifier learns no informa-
tion about the outsourced data. Note that encrypt-
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ing files before storing them on the cloud could be
a solution to the data privacy problem. However,
this solution reduces the issue to the complex key
management domain. Moreover, encrypting the files
before outsourcing is unnecessary in many applica-
tions such as in public cloud data, say outsourced
libraries or scientific datasets.
Contributions. Sebé et al. [24] proposed a data
possession checking protocol which achieves many de-
sirable properties such as unlimited number of verifi-
cations, low communication cost, blockless verification,
and security against a malicious server. However, this
scheme does not support public verifiability nor guaran-
tees data privacy. In a subsequent work, Hao et al. [25]
adopted Sebé et al.’s protocol [24] to support data dy-
namics and data privacy. They formalized a model for
data privacy and claimed that their protocol does not
leak any private information to third-party verifiers. In
this paper, we study Hao et al.’s protocol and make the
following three contributions.
– We observe that Hao et al.’s model does not cap-
ture the information leak regarding meta-data and
demonstrate how a third party verifier can make
use of the meta-data to learn information about the
stored data.
– We develop an enhanced model to address this weak-
ness, propose an improved scheme, and prove that
the new construction is secure under the enhanced
model.
– We demonstrate that the new scheme retains other
desirable properties of the original scheme [25] and
also develop a prototype to show our proposal is
practical.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review some preliminary knowledge
that will be used in this paper.
2.1 Remote data integrity checking for secure cloud
storage
A publicly verifiable remote data integrity checking ar-
chitecture [7, 11, 14] for security cloud storage is illus-
trated in Fig 1. Three different entities, namely, the
cloud user, the cloud server and the third party audi-
tor (TPA) are involved in the system. The cloud user
has large amount of data to be stored on the cloud
server without keeping a local copy, and the cloud server
has significant storage space and computation resources
and provides data storage services for cloud users. TPA
possesses expertise and capabilities that cloud users do
not have and is trusted to check the integrity of the
cloud data on behalf of the cloud user upon request.
They have their own obligations and benefits respec-
tively. The cloud server can be self-interested, and for
his own benefits, such as to maintain reputation, the
cloud server might hide data corruption incidents to
users. However, we assume that the cloud server has
no incentives to reveal the hosted data to TPA because
of regulations and financial incentives. The TPA’s job
is to perform the auditing on behalf the cloud user in
case that the user has no time, resources or feasibility
to monitor his data. However, the TPA is also curious
and may try to deduce some information of the data
during the auditing process.
Shared Data Flow
Cloud Server
Data Owner
Third Party Auditor
Privacy 
against TPA
Security
against 
server
Fig. 1 The system model of publicly verifiable remote data
checking
2.2 System components and its security
Following the definition in [9], a public remote data
checking scheme or auditing scheme is a tuple of five
algorithms, namely, Setup, TagGen, Challenge, Proof-
Gen and ProofCheck, which can be described as follows.
– Setup. On input a security parameter (k), this algo-
rithm generates the public key (pk) and secret key
(sk) for the data owner. pk is public to everyone but
sk is kept secret by the data owner.
– TagGen. On input the key pair (pk, sk) and a data
block (mi), this algorithm outputs a tag (Dmi) for
the block, which will be used for public verification
of data integrity.
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– Challenge. TPA generates a challenge chal to re-
quest for the integrity proof of the file by sending
chal to the server.
– GenProof. The server computes response R using
chal, the file and the tags, and returns R to TPA.
– CheckProof. TPA validates response R using chal,
the tags and public key pk. Secret key sk is not re-
quired in a publicly verifiable data integrity check-
ing scheme.
Three security requirements namely, completeness,
security against a malicious server (soundness), and pri-
vacy against the TPA (privacy), should be met for a
public data integrity checking scheme. Following the
security model due to Shacham and Waters [9], a data
auditing scheme is secure against a server if there exists
no polynomial-time algorithm that can cheat the TPA
with non-negligible probability. Formally, it is required
that there exists a polynomial-time extractor capable of
recovering the file by performing the challenges-response
protocols multiple times. Completeness and soundness
were defined as well by Shacham and Waters in [9].
Completeness says that when interacting with a valid
server, the algorithm of CheckProof will accept the re-
sponse. Soundness indicates that a cheating prover who
can convince a TPA it is storing the file is actually stor-
ing that file. We now review the security model against
a malicious server with public verifiability, in which two
entities are involved: an adversary and a challenger who
plays the role of the untrusted server and a data owner,
respectively.
Security against the server. This security game
captures the requirement that an adversary cannot suc-
cessfully generate a valid proof without storing all the
file blocks. The game consists of the following four phases,
namely, Setup, Query, Challenge and Forge.
– Setup. The challenger runs Setup algorithm to gen-
erate the public-secret key pair (pk, sk), forwards pk
to the adversary and keeps sk secret.
– Query. The adversary adaptively selects some data
blocks mi(i = 1, · · · , n) and makes tag queries. The
challenger computes the corresponding tag Di(i =
1, · · · , n) for these blocks and sends them back to
the adversary.
– Challenge. The challenger generates a challenge chal
and requests the adversary to respond a proof of
possession for the challenged blocks.
– Forge. The adversary computes a response R for the
data blocks indicated by chal and returns it to the
challenger.
We say the adversary wins the game if
CheckProof(pk, chal,Di(i = 1, · · · , n), R) succeeds. We
say that a public remote data integrity checking scheme
is secure against the server if for all polynomial-time ad-
versary that wins the above game, there exists another
polynomial-time algorithm Σ, denoted as knowledge
extractor, that is capable of extracting the file blocks.
The rationale of the model is that for any adversary
that can win the game, it can employ Σ to compute
the data blocks in polynomial time. In other words,
any algorithm that can answer the challenge must be
in possession of the underlying file blocks stored in one
form or another.
Privacy against the TPA. The term
“zero-knowledge public auditing” was first used by Wang
et al. [15] to describe the auditing schemes offering data
privacy against the TPA. However, no formal model
is presented. Following their terminology, we formally
define the notion “zero-knowledge privacy” as an en-
hanced privacy model of Hao et al. [25] with the goal
of capturing data privacy against the TPA in practice.
The spirit of our definition is that the TPA learns noth-
ing about the data blocks based on the publicly avail-
able information and the interaction with the cloud
server. To further strengthen the definition, we allow
the TPA to choose two equal length messages, m0 =
(m0,1, . . . ,m0,n) and m1 = (m1,1, . . . ,m1,n) and re-
quires that given a set of meta-data as well as inter-
action with the cloud server, the TPA cannot tell if
the cloud server is storing m0 or m1. The major dif-
ference between our model and Hao et al.’s model [25]
is that our model considers information leak from the
meta-data in addition to the execution of the challenge-
response protocol.
Formally, we consider the following game.
– Setup. The challenger runs Setup algorithm to gen-
erate the public-secret key pair (pk, sk), forwards pk
to the adversary and keeps sk secret.
– Query. The adversary submits two equal-length files,
m0 = (m0,1, . . . ,m0,n) and m1 = (m1,1, . . . ,m1,n)
to the challenger. The challenger chooses a random
bit b ∈R {0, 1} and returns
Di ← tagGen(mb,i, pk, sk) for i = 1 to n.
– Challenge. The adversary sends chal to the chal-
lenger.
– GenProof. The challenger computes response R us-
ing mb, chal and the tags {Di}.
– Guess. The adversary outputs a guess bit b′. It wins
the game if b′ = b.
We say that the advantage of an adversary is the
probability that it wins the above game minus 0.52. A
public remote data integrity checking scheme is data
2 This is to offset the winning probability based on random
guessing.
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private if the advantage of any polynomial-time adver-
sary is negligible.
3 Analysis of Hao et al.’s RDIC protocol
Hao et al. [25] proposed a privacy-preserving remote
data integrity checking protocol with data dynamics
and public verifiability. Their construction is based on
Sebé et al.’s protocol [24] and the homomorphic ver-
ifiable tag technique due to Ateniese et al. [6]. While
it can be shown that the challenge-response protocol
“does not leak any information of the data to TPA”, it
does not prevent the verifier from learning information
about the data from the meta-data. In other words, the
scheme itself cannot be said to be data private.
3.1 Review of the RDIC protocol
The remote data integrity checking protocol in [25] con-
sists of the following algorithms.
– Setup. Let N = pq be a publicly known RSA mod-
ulus [30], in which p = 2p′ + 1, q = 2q′ + 1 are
large primes. p′, q′ are two large primes as well.
QRN denotes the multiplicative cyclic group of the
quadratic residues modulo N . g, whose order is p′q′,
is a generator of QRN . The public key of the data
owner is pk = (N, g) while the secret key is sk =
(p, q).
– TagGen. For each file block mi, i ∈ [1, n], the data
owner computes the block tag as
Di = g
mi (mod N).
– Challenge. To check the integrity of the file m, the
TPA generates a random key r ∈ [1, 2k − 1] and
a random group element s ∈ Zn \ {0}, computes
gs = g
s (mod N) and sends chal = (r, gs) to the
cloud server.
– GenProof. Upon receiving the challenge chal = (r, gs),
the server generates a sequence of block indexes
a1, · · · , an by calling fr(i) for i ∈ [1, n] iteratively,
computes
R = g
n∑
i=1
aimi
s (mod N),
and sends R to the verifier.
– CheckProof. Upon receiving R from the server, the
TPA generates {ai}i=1,··· ,n firstly and then com-
putes P and R′ as follows:
P =
n∏
i=1
(Daii ) (mod N),
R′ = P s (mod N).
If R = R′, this algorithm outputs “success” to in-
dicate the data are kept virgin; Otherwise, outputs
“failure”.
3.2 On the privacy of the protocol
The verifier can determine if the client is storing a file
block m∗ from the public key (N, g) and meta-data
{Di}ni=1 by evaluating the following equations,
Di
?
= gm
∗
for i = 1 to n.
If any of the equality holds, the client is storing the file
block m∗.
We remark again that this “attack” is outside the
original security model which only assures no “addi-
tional” information can be obtained from the challenge-
response protocol. The issue being overlooked is the fact
that meta-data could contain information about the
underlying data. Indeed, any public auditing scheme
could be made “data private” under this model if the
meta-data contains the original data. For if this is the
case, the challenge-response protocol will leak no “ad-
ditional” information. On the other hand, the above
attack is captured by our enhanced model. Indeed, Hao
et al.’s construction is not data private under our defi-
nition.
4 An improved scheme and its security
In this section, we provide an improved remote data
integrity checking protocol supporting zero knowledge
privacy. Our construction is inspired by the sprit of zero
knowledge proof and the details of the new protocol are
as follows Fig.2.
– Setup. Let k, l be two security parameters. N = pq
is a public RSA modulus, in which p = 2p′ + 1, q =
2q′+1 are large primes. p′, q′ are two large primes as
well. QRN denotes the multiplicative cyclic group of
the quadratic residues modulo N . g, h are two gen-
erators of QRN . The public key of the data owner
is pk = (N, g) while the secret key is sk = (p, q). A
file m is divided into n blocks m1, · · · ,mn. H1, H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → ZN are secure cryptographic hash func-
tions. f : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}log2 (n) → {0, 1}l denotes a
pseudo-random function and π : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}log2 (n)
→ {0, 1}log2 (n) represents a pseudo-random permu-
tation.
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The Verifier Cloud Server
1. Retrieve file tags Di and verify
its signature. Quit if fail.
2. Generate a random challenge
chal = {c, k1, k2}
chal−−−−−−−−−→ 3. Determine indices ij and the
corresponding coefficients aj
of the challenged blocks.
4. Compute A =
c∑
j=1
ajmij , B =
c∑
j=1
ajhj ,
5. Check the proof π.
π←−−−−−−−−− π = PK{(A,B) : (
c∏
j=1
D
aj
ij
) = gAhB}
Fig. 2 Improved RDIC protocol supporting zero knowledge privacy
– TagGen. We assume that a file m = m1, · · · ,mn
has been encoded using the RS code [26] and the
blocks are distinct. The data owner picks a random
t ∈ ZN called a tag salt and appends t at the end of
the file. For each block mi, i ∈ [1, n], the data owner
computes the block tag as
Di = g
mihH1(mi,t) (mod N),
and stores (m||t,Di(1 ≤ i ≤ n)) into the server.
– Challenge. To check the integrity of file m, the ver-
ifier picks a random positive integer c and two keys
k1, k2 for f and π respectively and sends the chal-
lenge chal = (c, k1, k2) to the server.
– GenProof. Upon receiving chal = (c, k1, k2), the
server computes a response as follows.
1. For 1 ≤ j ≤ c, compute ij = πk2(j) as the
indices of the challenged blocks and computes
aj = fk1(j) as coefficients.
2. ComputeA =
c∑
j=1
ajmij , andB =
c∑
j=1
ajhj where
hj = H1(mij , t).
3. Randomly pick ρ1, ρ2 ∈ ZN , compute T = gρ1hρ2
(mod N), ξ = H2(T, chal) and z1 = ρ1 − ξA,
z2 = ρ2 − ξB.
4. Send R = (ξ, z1, z2) as the response to the veri-
fier.
– CheckProof. Upon receiving R from the server, the
verifier firstly generates the indices ij of the chal-
lenged blocks and the corresponding coefficients aj
and checks if
ξ
?
= H2(g
z1hz2(
c∏
j=1
D
aj
ij
)ξ (mod N), chal).
If the verification holds, this algorithm outputs “suc-
cess” to indicate the data are kept virgin; Otherwise,
outputs “failure”.
5 Security analysis of the new protocol
In this section, we show that the newly proposed scheme
achieves the properties of completeness, soundness and
zero knowledge privacy.
5.1 Completeness
If both the data owner and the server are honest, for
each valid tag Di and a random challenge chal = (c , k1,
k2), the completeness of the protocol can be elaborated
as follows.
gz1hz2(
c∏
j=1
D
aj
ij
)ξ = gρ1−ξAhρ2−ξB(
c∏
j=1
gajmij hajH1(mij ,t))ξ
= g
ρ1−ξA+
c∑
j=1
ajmij ξ
h
ρ2−ξB+
c∑
j=1
ajhjξ
= g
ρ1+ξ(
c∑
j=1
ajmij−A)
h
ρ2+ξ(
c∑
j=1
ajhj−B)
= gρ1hρ2
= T (mod N).
Thus, the following verification holds.
ξ = H2
(
T, chal
)
= H2
(
gz1hz2(
c∏
j=1
D
aj
ij
)ξ (mod N), chal
)
.
5.2 Soundness
If a malicious server can convince a verifier that he
stores the data using the proposed new scheme, we can
construct a simulator to extract the data in the random
oracle model. Otherwise, an instance of the factoriza-
tion problem can be solved.
Proof. What we are going to prove here is that for
any PPT adversary A who wins the soundness game of
some file blocks, there exists a challenger B that can
Enhanced Privacy of a Remote Data Integrity Checking Protocol for Secure Cloud Storage 7
construct a simulator S to extract these blocks. Oth-
erwise, the challenger can solve an instance of the fac-
torization problem. B is given a large integer N , the
product of two large primes p and q, and simulates the
environment as follows.
– Setup. B generates two random generators g, h of
QRN and sends pk = (N, g, h) as the public key to
the adversary A.
– Queries. A adaptively selects some blocks mi and
a tag salt tj to query B the tags of these blocks. B
computes hij = H1(mi, tj) and Di = g
mihhij , and
sends Di to A.
– Challenge. B picks an integer c, two keys k1, k2 ∈
{0, 1}k and generates a challenge chal = (c, k1, k2)
for c file blocks and sends it to A.
– Response. A generates a response R = (ξ, z1, z2)
and sends it back to B as integrity proof of the re-
quested blocks.
If the response can pass the proof check, i.e.,
ξ = H2(g
z1hz2(
c∏
j=1
D
aj
ij
)ξ (mod N), chal),
based on the well-known cryptographic techniques, the
oracle replay technique and the forking lemma due to
Pointcheval and Stern [27], the challenger can replay
the oracle H2 with the same randomness and a different
oracle to generate a new response R′ = (ξ′, z′1, z
′
2). The
challenger can obtain two pairs of collision for H2 as
(T, chal) and (T ′, chal). Thus, we have
gz1hz2(
c∏
j=1
D
aj
ij
)ξ = gz
′
1hz
′
2(
c∏
j=1
D
aj
ij
)ξ
′
(mod N).
That is
(g
c∑
j=1
ajmij
h
x∑
j=1
H1(mij ,t)aj
)ξ−ξ
′
= gz
′
1−z1hz
′
2−z2 (mod N).
According to the elegant conclusion due to Damg̊ard
and Fujisaki [28], ξ− ξ′ divides both z′1−z1 and z′2−z2
with significant probability. As a consequence, we have
g
c∑
j=1
ajmij
h
x∑
j=1
H1(mij ,t,i)aj
= g
z′1−z1
ξ−ξ′ h
z′2−z2
ξ−ξ′ (mod N).
Based on the discrete logarithm assumption, B can ex-
tract
c∑
j=1
ajmij =
z′1 − z1
ξ − ξ′
.
B then generates c challenges (c, k11, k2), · · · , (c, kc1,
k2) to challenge the same blocks using the approach de-
scribed above. For each challenge, B can get an equation
of the blocks. B can select such ki1(1 ≤ i ≤ c) that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a11 a
1
2 · · · a1c
a21 a
2
2 · · · a2c
...
...
...
...
ac1 a
c
2 · · · acc
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 6= 0
where aij = fki(j)(1 ≤ i, j ≤ c).
When the determinant is not zero, the following sys-
tem of linear equations has a unique solution.
a11m1j + a
1
2m2j + · · ·+ a1cmcj =
z1
1′−z11
ξ1−ξ1′ (mod p
′q′)
a21m1j + a
2
2m2j + · · ·+ a2cmcj =
z1
2′−z21
ξ2−ξ2′ (mod p
′q′)
...
ac1m1j + a
c
2m2j + · · ·+ accmcj =
z1
c′−zc1
ξc−ξc′ (mod p
′q′)
(1)
The simulator can get each challenged block m∗ij =
mij (mod p
′q′) by solving the system of linear equa-
tions. If m∗ij = mij for all aij = fki(j), the simulator
has successfully extracted all the changed blocks. We
show that all the challenged blocks are indeed extracted
by the simulator. Otherwise, assume aij 6= fki(j) but
m∗ij = mij+tp
′q′, where t is a non-zero integer, the chal-
lenger can make use of m∗ij −mij to factorize N [29],
which violates the factorization assumption.
5.3 Zero-knowledge privacy
In the random oracle model, the new protocol achieves
“zero-knowledge privacy”. To prove this property, we
construct a simulator S who plays the role of the chal-
lenger in the game. For any public key (N, g, h) and
system parameters (k, l,H1, H2, f, π), S interacts with
the adversary A as follows.
– Setup. S forwards the public key to the adversary.
– Query. The adversary submits two equal-length files,
m0 = (m0,1, . . . ,m0,n) and m1 = (m1,1, . . . ,m1,n)
to S. For i = 1 to n, S picks Di ∈R N∗ and returns
{Di} to A.
– Challenge. The adversary sends chal = (c, k1, k2) as
the challenge to S.
– GenProof. S simulates the response as follows.
1. Pick a random tag-salt t ∈ ZN for m and for
each block mi in m, compute
Di = g
mihH1(mi,t) (mod N),
as the tag of mi.
2. For a challenge (c, k1, k2), compute the indices
ij = πk2(j) of the challenged blocks and coeffi-
cients aj = fk1(j).
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3. Pick a random ξ∗ ∈ Zn and two integers z∗1
and z∗2 , and compute T
∗ = gz
∗
1hz
∗
2 (
c∏
j=1
D
aj
ij
)ξ
∗
(mod N).
4. Take H2 as a random oracle and set the
H2(T
∗, chal)→ ξ∗.
5. Out R∗ = (ξ∗, z∗1 , z
∗
2) as the response.
– Guess. The adversary outputs a guess bit b′.
We argue that the probability of b′ = b must be 0.5
since the tags {Di} and response R∗ are independent
of b. It remains to show the tags and response given
to A are distributed correctly. Firstly, for any value of
mb,i there exists a value rb,i such that Di = g
mihrb,i .
The above simulation implicitly sets rb,i = H1(mb,i, t)
3.
Since t is never given to the adversary, this simulation
is perfect. As for the response, note that for any file
mb and the respectively Ab, Bb, there exists ρb,1, ρb,2
such that z1 = ρb,1 − ξ∗Ab and z2 = ρb,2 − ξ∗Bb. In
addition, z1, z2 are statistically indistinguishable with
the actually responses produced using m0 or m1. Thus,
the simulation provided to A is correctly distributed.
This completes the proof.
6 Data dynamics operations
In the improved protocol, the tag generation depends
only on the block content and is independent of the in-
dex of this block and the content of other blocks. As
a result, the protocol fully supports data dynamics at
the block level including block insertion, block modifi-
cation and block deletion. The detailed descriptions are
as follows.
– Block Insertion. When needing to insert a new
block mx before mi(1 ≤ i ≤ n), the data owner gen-
erates a tag for mx as Dx = g
mxhH1(mx,t) (mod N)
and then constructs an update message “update=(I ,
i, mx, Dx)” and sends it to the cloud server, where
I denotes the block insertion operation. Upon re-
ceiving the request, the server updates the stored
file to m′ = m1 · · ·mi−1mxmi · · ·mn and updates
the block tags to D1 · · ·Di−1DxDi · · ·Dn.
– Block Deletion. When needing to delete block
mi, the data owner constructs an update message
“update=(D,i,mi,Di)” and sends it to the cloud server,
where D denotes the block deletion operation. The
server updates the stored file to m′ = m1 · · · mi−1
mi+1 · · · mn and the block tags to D1 · · · Di−1
Di+1 · · · Dn.
3 This is allowed in the random oracle model where H1 is
modelled as an ideal random function.
– Block Modification. When needing to modify
mi to m
∗
i , the data owner generates a tag for m
∗
i as
D∗i = g
m∗i hH1(m
∗
i ,t) (mod N) and constructs an up-
date message “update=(M, i, m∗i , D
∗
i )” and sends it
to the cloud server, where M denotes the block mod-
ification operation. The server updates the stored
file to m′ = m1 · · ·mi−1m∗imi+1 · · ·mn and updates
the block tags to D1 · · ·Di−1D∗iDi+1 · · ·Dn.
7 Performance analysis and implementation
In this section, we firstly report the complexity analysis
of communication, computation and storage costs of the
improved protocol, and then describe the experimental
results.
7.1 Complexity analysis
Communication cost. In the challenge phase, the
verifier sends (c, k1, k2) to the server, which is of binary
length log2 c + 2k. In the response phase, the server
returns R = (ξ, z1, z2) as the response to the verifier,
which is log2N + log2 z1 + log2 z2.
Computation cost. We present the computation
cost from the viewpoint of the data owner, the server
and the verifier. Let Tprf (len), Tprp(len) denote the time
cost of generating a len-bit pseudo-random number or
performing a permutation of len-bit number. Tadd(len)
stands for the time cost of adding two len-bit numbers,
and Texp(len, num) represents the time cost of comput-
ing a modular exponentiation of a len-bit long exponent
modular num.
The dominated computation of the data owner is
generating tags for file blocks as Di = g
mihH1(mi,t)
(mod N). According to the Euler Theorem, since gcd(g,
N) = 1 and gcd(h,N) = 1, we have gφ(N) = 1 (mod N)
and hφ(N) = 1 (mod N). Thus, the data owner can
compute gmi (mod φ(N))hH1(mi,t) (mod φ(N)) (mod N) in-
stead of computing gmihH1(mi,t) (mod N) directly, which
will save significant computation cost since modulo op-
erations are far more efficient than modular exponentia-
tions. To generate a proof, the server needs to perform c
pseudo-random functions and c pseudo-random permu-
tations to determine the indices of the challenged blocks
and the corresponding coefficients. The main cost is
computing the sum
c∑
j=1
ajmij ,
c∑
j=1
ajhj and exponen-
tiations gρ1 , gρ2 . aj is of l bits long and assume each
block is d bits long, the cost of computing ajmij is up-
per bounded by l−1 additions of d+ l-bit integers. The
computation cost of summing them is upper bounded
by c−1 additions of log2 c+d+l- bit integers. Similarly,
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The computation cost of computing
c∑
j=1
ajhj is upper
bounded by c − 1 additions of log2 c + log2N + l-bit
integers. Thus the total computation cost of the cloud
server is upper bounded by
cTprf (log2 c) + cTprp(log2 c) + 2Texp(log2N,N)+
(c−1)Tadd(log2 c+d+l)+(c−1)Tadd(log2 c+log2N+l).
In the verification phase, the main computation is gz1hz2
(
c∏
j=1
D
aj
ij
)ξ, and so the total computation cost of the
verifier is
cTprf (log2 c) + cTprp(log2 c) + Texp(log2 z1, N)+
Texp(log2 z2, N) + cTexp(l + log2N,N).
Storage cost. Regarding the storage cost of the
cloud server and the verifier, since we need the prop-
erty of public verifiability, both the data and the tags
are stored at the server side. Traditional integrity pro-
tection methods, say a secure digital signature mecha-
nism can be employed to protect the tags from being
tampered by external and internal adversaries. In this
case, what stored on the cloud are as follows.
Data fils‖Tag salt Tags Signature of tags
The storage cost of the block tags is upper bounded
by dlog2(m)/de log2N bits. When performing an au-
diting task now, the tags are transmitted back to the
verifier from the cloud server, which will incur commu-
nication costs that are linear to the number of blocks.
Fortunately, due to the employment of the modular of
composite order, the tags can be relatively much smaller
compared with the original files. The data owner only
needs to store the public key N, g, the private key (p, q)
and the tag-salt t, so the storage cost of the data owner
is 3 log2N+log2 p+log2 q bits. A verifier needs to store
the public key N, g, thus, his storage cost is 2 log2N
bits.
7.2 Implementation results
The implementation was conducted with MAGMA [31]
on Xeon E5640 CPUs @ 2.66GHz. The memory is al-
ways sufficient since the scheme only requires a polyno-
mial space. In our implementation, we uses RSA-1024,
where N is of 1024 bits, p and q are 512 bits each. Our
tests aim to determine the cost of the following algo-
rithms: TagGen, ProofGen and CheckProof. We note
that the time for the Setup and Challenge steps are not
shown in the result. Since the Setup is run for one time
only, which incurs a cost of approximately 300 seconds,
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Fig. 3 Total Time for TagGen vs Size of Blocks
while essentially the Challenge step only requires an ex-
ponentiation operation over ZN , and hence, the timing
is negligible.
To observe the impact of the number of blocks and
the block sizes, we proceed our tests as follows: we use
different size of files for our tests, from 1 MB to 512
MB. Then, for each file size, we tested different block
sizes, from 1 KB to 128 KB. Specifically, the following
figures illustrate the results of our tests in details.
The tag generation procedure is efficient in general.
This is due to the fact that the owner knows φ(N) and
subsequently, exponentiations are performed with re-
spect to relatively small exponents (large exponents can
be computed modulo φ(N) first). On the other hand,
proof generation, performed by the server, is a bit more
costly, since one needs to perform two exponentiations
with large exponent (z1 and z2). The CheckProof pro-
cedure, performed by the auditor, is most costly, since
in this process, one needs to do polynomial in c number
of exponentiations.
In more details, Fig. 3 shows that the total time for
TagGen is almost linear with the increment of the size
of the block i.e. for a same block size, the TagGen time
is doubled when one increases the size of the file by
two. This is natural since doubling the file size implies
doubling the total number of blocks. In the meantime,
for a constant file size, it is also linear with the inverse
of the size of the blocks. This is in accordance with our
empirical analysis since block size is inversely propor-
tional to the total number of blocks and as discussed,
for TagGen, increasing the block size has negligible ef-
fect on the cost of an exponentiation for the owner since
exponents can always be computed modulo φ(N). Like-
wise, when one increases the size of the blocks, the gen-
eration time for the tags is decreasing.
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Fig. 4 shows that the size of the tags is linear with
the increment of the size of the blocks, and hence, is
linear with the increase of the number of the blocks.
This is because for each block, the size of the tag is
constant that depends only on N .
The timing of ProofGen is the product of two com-
ponents: the number of the tags, and the cost to gener-
ate each tag. The latter component is depending on the
size of the block. Therefore, from Fig. 5 one can see that
it takes more time when the size of the block is either
very small (this implies large number of tags) or very
big (this implies to generate one tag is very costly). The
best scenario takes place when the size of the block is
4 KB or 8 KB.
It is also observed in Fig. 6 that with the increment
of the size of the blocks, the time to check the proof
decreases as well. However, the decrement was merely
negligible.
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 1 2 4  8  16  32  64  128
T
im
e 
(in
 lo
ga
rit
hm
ic
)
Size of Block (kbits)
1MB
2MB
4MB
8MB
16MB
32MB
64MB
128MB
256MB
512MB
Fig. 6 Total Time for CheckProof vs Size of Blocks
Finally, we suggest that in practice, the best size of
the block is between 4 KB and 8 KB, which delivers the
best performance for our system.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated data privacy issues in re-
mote data integrity checking protocols. We showed that
the existing privacy-preserving remote data integrity
checking protocol [25] could not achieve the desired
goal of “leaking no information to a third party”. We
formalized the notion of “zero-knowledge privacy” and
proposed an improved version of the protocol in [25] to
achieve this property. In addition, we proved that our
protocol satisfied other security requirements. Finally,
both the performance analysis and the implementation
showed that our improvement was practical.
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